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I. INTRODUCTION
The global ﬁnancial crisis had dire economic consequences for a host of public and private
sector agents across advanced and emerging economies. The crisis was a time of heightened
uncertainty, ﬁnancial distress and widespread ﬁrm closures. All ﬁrms continuing as going
concerns however, with lower investment after a rise in uncertainty, may not be equivalent
to some ﬁrms closing completely due to uncertainty.1 Reinforcing this eﬀect, ﬁrms are more
likely to experience bankruptcy and to be more susceptible to macroeconomic and ﬁrm spe-
ciﬁc uncertainty, in a situation in which they experience poor ﬁnancial health, see Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) and Ghosal and Loungani (2000). Whether researchers fully
model the impact of uncertainty on economic activity depends upon, at least partly, whether
ﬁrms survive or close their operations completely. Surprisingly there is limited empirical ev-
idence regarding the eﬀect of uncertainty on ﬁrm closure, for example during the recent
ﬁnancial crisis.
In this paper, we consider the role of ﬁrm-level uncertainty in ﬁrms’ hazard of failure
during economic downturns. More precisely, we generate a measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncer-
tainty that stems from ﬁrms’ volatility in sales. Then we observe the most recent ﬁnancial
crisis which provides an interesting set-up to explore the role of uncertainty in ﬁrms’ failure.
Finally, we look at the ﬁnancial health of the ﬁrm, reﬂected in the quality of its balance
sheet. Our empirical work is based on an assessment of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty on ﬁrms’
chances of failure using an unbalanced panel of 9,457 UK ﬁrms between 2000-09. We employ
annual ﬁrm-level data from the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database. A discrete
proportional hazard model examines failure probability for ﬁrms with diﬀerent balance sheet
characteristics and exposure in micro and macro uncertainty. Then we take into account
ﬁrms’ reliance on bank debt as well as their ownership structure (public or private).
In doing so, we contribute to the existing literature in three important ways. First, we
1It is a standard result in the theoretical literature that uncertainty is associated with a decline in
economic activity, see Mishkin (2011). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provides one appealing explanation for why
irreversible investment is reduced by uncertainty.
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investigate the link between uncertainty and ﬁrm survival, paying special attention to the
most recent ﬁnancial crisis. While there is a large and growing literature on the eﬀects of
uncertainty on ﬁrms’ investment, capital structure and inventories (see Baum, Stephan and
Talavera (2009); Baum, Caglayan and Talavera (2010a,b); Caglayan, Maioli and Mateut
(2012) and Caglayan and Rashid (2014)), less attention has been given to the important
dimension of ﬁrm survival. Yet, the potential closure of a great number of businesses was
one of the most visible threats to economic performance during the Great Recession. As far
as we are aware, the present study is the ﬁrst to provide a systematic analysis of the link
between uncertainty at the micro level, and corporate failures during the most recent global
ﬁnancial crisis.
Second, this paper accounts for the important dimension of ﬁrm heterogeneity, distin-
guishing between ﬁrms which are likely to be more or less dependent on bank ﬁnance. This
is particularly important since UK banks interrupted their lines of credit during the crisis
due to liquidity problems (Bell and Young (2010)). This phenomenon was also evident in
Europe as shown in the results of the EU bank lending survey which points to a substantial
reduction in loan supply and increased lending standards that exposed bank dependent bor-
rowers. Hence, identifying those companies which rely heavily on bank ﬁnance will allow us
to provide a sharper test of the eﬀect of uncertainty on ﬁrm survival. We also distinguish
between public and private ﬁrms, since the latter are smaller and typically are associated
with the highest degree of information asymmetry.2
Third, we employ a much broader sample of ﬁrms than other studies in the literature. Our
data-set is made up mainly by unlisted companies. Unlike previous studies which typically
rely on listed companies, see for example Baum, Stephan and Talavera (2009) and Baum,
Caglayan and Talavera (2010a,b), we use a large panel of ﬁnancial data on UK ﬁrms, over
98% of which are not quoted on the stock market. This characteristic is vitally important
since these ﬁrms are more likely to suﬀer from information asymmetry problems and hence
2There is evidence showing that the leverage of private UK manufacturing ﬁrms is more sensitive to
ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk compared to their public counterparts (Caglayan and Rashid (2014)).
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will be aﬀected the most during extreme economic events.
To preview our results, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of the impact of uncertainty on ﬁrm
survival in the UK using a broader sample of ﬁrms than is typically used in the literature.
Indeed, the impact of uncertainty is more potent in the recent crisis period compared to the
great moderation. Furthermore our data-set is able to uncover important heterogeneity in
ﬁrm behavior. We identify that both more bank-dependent and non-public ﬁrms are greatly
impacted by uncertainty, and this eﬀect is magniﬁed during the crisis. Overall, our evidence
provides a key contribution to the literature on ﬁrm survival, uncertainty and ﬁnancial
distress.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. In the section ‘ECONOMIC BACKGROUND’,
we provide a short discussion of the related literature. Section ‘HYPOTHESES AND
METHODOLOGY’ presents the hypotheses and the empirical methods used. Section ‘DATA
AND SUMMARY STATISTICS’ describes our data and presents some summary statistics.
Sections ‘MAIN RESULTS’ and ‘ROBUSTNESS TESTS’ illustrate our main empirical re-
sults and robustness tests. Section ‘CONCLUSIONS’ concludes.
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
The theoretical and empirical literature conﬁrms that uncertainty is associated with a
decline in output, investment and employment at the aggregate and disaggregate level. Sig-
niﬁcant contributions in this area include, for example, studies from Dixit and Pindyck
(1994), Caballero (1999) and Bond and Van Reenen (2007). There is less work however, on
uncertainty and ﬁrm survival. Firms operating with less investment may not be equivalent
to some ﬁrms closing completely due to uncertainty. That is to say, uncertainty may have
diﬀerent implications for the economy depending upon whether ﬁrms close or not, and hence
diﬀerent implications for long run productive capacity of an economy. Bloom (2007, 2009)
highlights how temporary uncertainty may be associated with a temporary downturn, but
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ﬁrms shall become active again once uncertainty subsides. Clearly, if ﬁrms are more suscep-
tible to close down this will have implications for an economy’s capacity to return to trend
growth. The irreversibility channel of uncertainty therefore maybe more potent when we
consider the possibility that ﬁrms may close.
Although there is less work looking at uncertainty and ﬁrm survival, there is an estab-
lished literature that examines uncertainty and ﬁrm-level investment and R&D, see Ghosal
and Loungani (2000), Ghosal (2003), Baum, Caglayan and Talavera (2010b) and Gilchrist,
Sim and Zakrajsek (2013).3
Bloom (2007) argues that uncertainty about future productivity and demand condi-
tions will generate ﬂuctuations in investment, hiring and productivity. Higher uncertainty
generates a temporary slowdown and bounce back as ﬁrms postpone activity and wait for
uncertainty to subside. This eﬀect is expected to be stronger during recessions. Dixit (1989)
emphasizes the implications of an uncertain environment on entry and exit decisions of ﬁrms.
In particular, Ghosal and Loungani (2000) show that uncertainty has a negative eﬀect on
investment, which is greater in the small-ﬁrm-dominated industries. There is, however, lim-
ited empirical evidence regarding the eﬀect of uncertainty on the UK economy particularly
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis, where uncertainty remained at an elevated level for an
extended period of time. Using Granger causality tests, Haddow et al. (2013) argue that
higher levels of uncertainty has been a factor restraining the UK recovery and may adversely
aﬀect growth. Denis and Kannan (2013) ﬁnd in their VAR analysis that uncertainty shocks
have a signiﬁcant impact on UK industrial production and GDP and a somewhat limited
eﬀect on employment.
Our paper is also innovative since it also considers the interrelation between ﬁrm sur-
vival, uncertainty and ﬁnancial shocks. It is generally accepted that following an adverse
shock ﬁrms with poorer indicators of creditworthiness on their balance sheets will be more
3For an extensive survey of microeconomic studies of investment and uncertainty see Bond and Van
Reenen (2007). In particular, prominent work in the literature on ﬁrm investment and uncertainty include
Leahy and Whited (1996), Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Bloom (2007).
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constrained than those that are considered creditworthy. Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1996) presents a theoretical channel whereby ﬁnancial structure impacts ﬁrm behavior. The
“ﬂight to quality” by lenders, identiﬁed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), under-
lies much of the dynamic adjustment observable in the macro-economy due to the credit
channel following an adverse shock. Furthermore, the experience of UK corporates after the
recent global ﬁnancial crisis suggests that the ﬁnancial system can generate an endogenous
cycle (the accelerator) that propagates the initial shock over time c.f. Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist (1996). Firms that initially have a lower credit ratings and are refused exter-
nal ﬁnance on this basis can ﬁnd that their creditworthiness deteriorates further, putting
future external ﬁnance further out of reach. The implication is that ﬁrms that are relatively
constrained on the ﬁnancial markets, will face higher agency costs of borrowing - a higher
“external premium” - for raising capital from ﬁnancial markets compared with the cost of
internal ﬁnance funded from retained earnings (see also Bernanke and Gertler (1995)). The
external ﬁnance premium is inversely related to the ﬁrms’ balance sheet i.e. net worth,
and to macroeconomic conditions, creating a countercyclical movement in the premium for
external funds, which serves to amplify borrower’s spending and economic activity in the
ﬁnancial accelerator (see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996, 1999)).
Ghosal and Loungani (2000) suggest the investment uncertainty nexus operates through
capital market imperfections. Ghosal (2003) highlights that uncertainty and sunk costs at
the industry level have a large negative impact on entry and exit probabilities of ﬁrms.4
The interrelationship between uncertainty, investment and ﬁnancial variables is discussed
by Baum, Stephan and Talavera (2009) and Baum, Caglayan and Talavera (2010a,b). The
aforementioned studies identify an important channel by which uncertainty reduces ﬁrm
access to credit, consequently leading to lower investment. Baum, Stephan and Talavera
(2009) identify a strong negative relationship between debt and macroeconomic uncertainty.
Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajsek (2013) also examine how macroeconomic uncertainty inﬂu-
4In this context, ﬁrm size may be an important determinant.
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ences investment through ﬁnancial frictions. Using macro and micro evidence, they establish
that uncertainty impacts investment largely through credit spreads. Speciﬁcally, increases
in uncertainty are associated with a widening of credit spreads and a decline in output. By
delineating an alternative transmission mechanism, this calls into question the option value
of waiting approach that exists in the literature. As a consequence this research proposes a
speciﬁc channel by which uncertainty can impact upon ﬁrm survival.
Finally, Huynh et al. (2010) and Huynh and Petrunia (2010) present empirical evidence
on the determinants of ﬁrm survival and growth, showing that ﬁrms’ leverage matters for
both activities and has a non-linear impact on survival. Indeed, it may be the case that high
leverage (or low proﬁtability) does not have a persistent eﬀect on economic activity, but the
consequences of leverage for ﬁrm survival impinge upon recovery from recession. Such a view
may contribute to our understanding of business cycles, Hall (2010). In the next section we
review speciﬁc research questions and discuss our empirical methods.
III. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
(A) Research Questions
This paper seeks to consider a number of research questions. Firstly, we evaluate the
direct eﬀect of micro uncertainty on ﬁrms’ failures for UK ﬁrms, the vast majority of which
are not quoted on the stock market. After controlling for macro uncertainty and a number
of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and ﬁnancial indicators we might expect that ﬁrm-level uncertainty will lead
to higher failure rates.
Secondly, we examine the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty on the hazard of failure in
and out of the most recent ﬁnancial crisis. This can be tested through interactions between
the measures of uncertainty and a time-period dummy, which is aimed at capturing the
2007-09 global ﬁnancial crisis. One should expect that ﬁrms will be more likely to fail
during periods of economic uncertainty since ﬁrms have to postpone their activities. This
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eﬀect might be ampliﬁed during economic downturns since ﬁrms ﬁnd it extremely diﬃcult to
attract external funding at a reasonable cost and therefore have to cut down their activities.
Thirdly, we test the probability of failure for diﬀerent groups of ﬁrms in and out of the
crisis, taking into account the uncertainty measures. Due to the nature of our data, we
take into account ﬁrm heterogeneity by looking at the extent to which ﬁrms rely upon bank
funding. As banks signiﬁcantly restricted loans towards small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) during the ﬁnancial crisis, it is reasonable to suppose that bank-dependent ﬁrms are
likely to have suﬀered more than their less bank-dependent counterparts. This argument is
in line with Bell and Young (2010), who discuss statistics on loans to SMEs and syndicated
loan spreads in the UK. They note that while investment-grade spreads peaked in 2008,
they have fallen back after the crisis. We should expect to ﬁnd that more-bank dependent
ﬁrms to be more likely to fail when faced with higher levels of uncertainty compared to their
less bank-dependent counterparts. Moreover, this link should be more important during the
crisis. Finally, we intend to corroborate our results using the distinction between public and
non-public ﬁrms. The latter group is more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained and hence
may respond more strongly to uncertainty compared to the former group of ﬁrms, especially
during extreme economic events.
(B) Empirical Speciﬁcations
(i) Baseline Model
To evaluate the eﬀect of uncertainty on the likelihood of ﬁrm failure, we use a com-
plementary log-log model (cloglog), a discrete time version of the Cox proportional hazard
model. This methodology is particularly indicated given that we are interested in investi-
gating the determinants of the timing of ﬁrms’ chances of failure. Considering this objective
our analysis is related to the passage of time before the event of failure occurs. The cloglog
model accounts for the incompletely observed lifespan of ﬁrms surviving past the sample
and allows us to capture the exact time of failure, addressing in this way the potential right
7
censoring bias.5 The assumption of the proportional hazard model is that the hazard ratio
depends only on time at risk, 0(t) (the so-called baseline hazard) and on explanatory vari-
ables aﬀecting the hazard independently of time, exp(0K). The hazard ratio is then given
by:
(t;K) = 0(t)exp(
0K) (1)
The discrete-time hazard function, h(j;K), shows the interval hazard for the period
between the beginning and the end of the jth year after the ﬁrst appearance of the ﬁrm. This
hazard rate, which is the rate at which ﬁrms fail at time t given that they have survived in
t  1, takes the following form:
h(j;K) = 1  exp[ exp(0K + j)] (2)
where we are particularly interested in identifying the  parameters, which show the
eﬀect of the explanatory variables incorporated in vector K on the hazard rate. In the Tables
presented below, we report coeﬃcients, rather than hazard ratios (exponential coeﬃcients).
The interpretation of the coeﬃcients is as follows. A positive coeﬃcient indicates that an
increase in the associated explanatory variable leads to an increase in the hazard of failure
in any given year. A negative coeﬃcient estimate suggests that the explanatory variable is
negatively associated with the hazard and therefore reduces the probability of failure. When
interpreting our results, it is useful to look at the exponentiated coeﬃcients, that have the
interpretation of the ratio of the hazard for one unit change in the explanatory variable.
In our discussion of the ﬁndings, we will present detailed examples of how we calculate the
magnitude of the coeﬃcients.6
5To capture the particular nature of the data-set, given that it is collected on a yearly basis, the cloglog
model is more appropriate than the standard Cox model, see Görg and Spaliara (2014). Also, see Jenkins
(2005) for an excellent overview of complementary log-log and proportional hazard models.
6j is the log of the diﬀerence between the integrated baseline hazard evaluated at the end and the
beginning of the interval. It, thus, captures duration dependence. We do not impose any restrictions on
these parameters, rather we estimate a full set of gammaj time dummies.
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We set out a benchmark model to estimate how ﬁrms’ probability of failure is aﬀected
by uncertainty and their ﬁnancial conditions:
h(j;X) = 1  exp[ exp(0 + 1Sigma+ 2X + 3Y + j)] (3)
where Sigma represents the uncertainty measured at the micro (ﬁrm) level. The sign and
signiﬁcance of 1 shows the importance of uncertainty on the probability of ﬁrms’ failure.
Vectors X and Y denote a set of control variables that have been found to be inﬂuential in
ﬁrm survival studies. We partition the control variables into ﬁnancial and other explicators.
Measuring Firm-Speciﬁc Uncertainty
There is an extensive literature examining the impact of uncertainty in other contexts
and we seek to exploit that literature. Several studies use uncertainty on forecast earnings
or proﬁts, von Kalckreuth (2000) and Lensink, Bo and Sterken (1999). Baum, Caglayan
and Talavera (2010b) use a CAPM measure to identify the impact of ﬁrm uncertainty on
investment. To measure ﬁrm uncertainty Leahy and Whited (1996) and Bloom, Bond and
Van Reenen (2001) use volatility of stock prices. Ghosal and Loungani (2000) use proﬁt
forecasting to predict future proﬁt in order to assess the impact of uncertainty on investment.
Sales have been employed as a proxy for ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty by Lensink, Bo and Sterken
(1999) and Caglayan, Maioli and Mateut (2012) who test the eﬀect of sales volatility on
inventory investment and by Garcia-Vega, Guariglia and Spaliara (2012) who assess the
eﬀect of uncertainty on exporting.7
The heterogeneity amongst ﬁrms in our data allows us to employ a proxy of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc uncertainty using ﬁrms’ sales in line with previous studies (Lensink, Bo and Sterken
(1999), Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004), Garcia-Vega, Guariglia and Spaliara (2012) and
Caglayan, Maioli and Mateut (2012)). In particular, we construct our uncertainty measure
7Other authors use ﬁrm surveys of expectations (see Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Patillo (1998) or a
theoretical measure of microeconomic uncertainty (Carlsson (2007)).
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by estimating ﬁrst an AR(1) model of sales augmented with time and industry-speciﬁc dum-
mies.8 To take into account the panel data nature of our data-set we employ a GMM system
estimator (see Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)). We verify that
the diagnostics do not indicate any problems regarding the choice and the relevance of our
instruments. Uncertainty is then computed as the standard deviation of the ﬁrm’s total real
sales calculated over the three years preceding and including year t.9; 10
Other Inﬂuences
X is a vector of ﬁnancial variables Leverage and Profitability. Both variables capture
diﬀerent aspects of the ﬁnancial health of a ﬁrm. We control for ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial health moti-
vated by the theoretical model of Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)11 and previous empirical
studies ( Bunn and Redwood (2003); Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Huynh et al. (2010)).
To begin with ﬁnancial leverage (Leverage), which is measured as the ratio of total current
liabilities over total assets, we note that high levels of existing debt are associated with
a worse balance sheet situation, which would increase moral hazard and adverse selection
problems, and lead to the inability of ﬁrms to obtain external ﬁnance at a reasonable cost
(see Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajsek (2004) and Mizen and Tsoukas (2012)). Zingales (1998)
and Bridges and Guariglia (2008) argue that higher leverage results in higher failure proba-
bilities. Accordingly, we expect a positive relationship between leverage and the probability
of survival.
8Alternative measures of ﬁrm level of uncertainty can in principle be extract from, for example, CBI survey
data, see Mitchell, Mouratidis and Weale (2007). However, the concordance of ﬁrms would present signiﬁcant
challenges and coverage may be incomplete for our unlisted ﬁrms. Moreover Multivariate GARCH methods
based upon the cross sectional data could be adopted, but this would present signiﬁcant computational
challenges given the short time dimension of the data.
9We check the sensitivity of our results to using a diﬀerent measure of sales uncertainty computed over
the four years preceding and including year t (see the Robustness section).
10It should be noted that given the way in which we calculate uncertainty, this variable is not available
for the years 2000 and 2001. For this reason, all regressions which contain our main measure of uncertainty
are based on the sample 2002–2009.
11Their model generates a role for capital structure in an asymmetric information setup. The theoretical
frameworks on survival were ﬁrstly introduced by Hopehayn (1992) and Jovanovic (1982) without considering
a role for moral hazard.
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Proﬁtability (Profitability) is deﬁned as the ratio of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts before interests
and tax to its total assets. We use this indicator to measure a ﬁrm’s eﬃciency. It is widely
accepted that internal funds can serve as a buﬀer to absorb unexpected losses, reducing
the probability of insolvency and, therefore, the expected bankruptcy cost (see Bunn and
Redwood (2003) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008)). We therefore expect to ﬁnd proﬁtability
to decrease the probability of failure.
The covariates used in the vector Y are all chosen in view of other work on ﬁrm sur-
vival. We add the ﬁrm size (Size) measured as the logarithm of real total assets. According
to Geroski (1995), a ﬁrm’s size plays an important role in determining ﬁrm failures. The
argument is that large ﬁrms experience higher survival probabilities than their smaller coun-
terparts because they have access to alternative sources of external ﬁnance and they are
less informationally opaque. Thus large ﬁrms are less likely to fail than small ﬁrms (Dunne,
Roberts and Samuelson (1998) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)). In our analysis we
expect to ﬁnd a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and the probability of survival. We
also include the age of the ﬁrm (Age) which measures the number of years since the ﬁrm’s
birth. Firms with an established track record are less likely to fail than those that are
younger because they are usually more able to withstand past economic and ﬁnancial down-
turns and therefore face a smaller liquidation risk. This would be the case both for domestic
and multinational ﬁrms as noted by Görg and Strobl (2002). Consequently, we anticipate a
negative relationship between age and the probability of failure.
In addition, we account for whether a ﬁrm is part of a larger corporation or a group (UK
or foreign). Following the relevant literature, we construct the dummy variable Group, which
takes the value one if a ﬁrm is part of a group, and zero otherwise. We expect to observe
a negative relationship between this variable and the hazard of failure since group ﬁrms
are likely to have better access to capital markets and to respond more quickly to shocks
than single ﬁrms, due to better information processing (Disney et al., 2003; and Bridges
and Guariglia (2008)). We also control for foreign ownership by using a dummy variable,
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Ownership, equal to one if the share of foreign ownership in a ﬁrm’s equity exceeds 24.99%,
and 0 otherwise. The evidence on the impact of foreign-owned ﬁrms on survival chances is
mixed.12 Therefore, we should expect ownership to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on failure but
its sign will be determined by the data.
In vector Y we also control for the macroeconomic conditions by adding the real exchange
rate, which measures the exchange rate environment. Baggs, Beaulieu and Fung (2009) doc-
ument a negative association between survival and appreciation of the Canadian dollar. We
expect the exchange rate (Exchange) to be positively associated with the ﬁrm’s probabil-
ity to fail. In addition, we control for aggregate uncertainty by using a policy uncertainty
measure. This economic policy uncertainty measure for the UK is drawn from Baker, Bloom
and Davis (2013). It is constructed with a 50% weight on a news-based component from the
Financial Times and The Times newspapers (i.e. the mention of policy relevant terms) and
50% on Consensus Economics CPI and budget deﬁcit forecaster disagreement. We expect
higher levels of aggregate uncertainty to reduce ﬁrms’ chances of survival. Finally, our model
includes a full set of time, industry and regional dummies. To obtain eﬃcient estimators
and unbiased standard errors we apply the Huber-White sandwich or robust estimator.
(ii) The Eﬀect of the Crisis
In order to examine whether the hazard of failure diﬀers in crisis years compared to
tranquil periods, we augment Equation (3) with a ﬁnancial crisis dummy (Crisis), which
takes value one over the period 2007-09, and zero otherwise. The ﬁnancial crisis might have
both a direct and an indirect impact on exit by magnifying the eﬀect of uncertainty on ﬁrms’
likelihood to fail.
12Using data from Ireland and Indonesia, respectively, Görg and Strobl (2003) and Bernard and Sjöholm
(2003) show that multinationals are more likely to exit than domestic ﬁrms. On the other hand, Blalock,
Gertler and Levine (2008), and Desai and Forbes (2008) ﬁnd that global engagement improves ﬁrms’ perfor-
mance, and hence reduces their likelihood of failure.
12
h(j;X) = 1 exp[ exp(0+1SigmaCrisis+2Sigma(1 Crisis)+3Crisis+4X+5Y+j)]
(4)
This test is motivated by the ﬁnancial-accelerator-related hypothesis according to which
a deterioration in economic conditions negatively aﬀects the health of ﬁrms’ balance sheets.
In these circumstances, ﬁrms facing increased levels of uncertainty might face a higher prob-
ability of failure during the crisis than outside. The sign and signiﬁcance of the interacted
terms will reveal the extent to which the impact of uncertainty on ﬁrm survival diﬀers during
tranquil and turbulent periods. We expect the eﬀects of changes in the uncertainty on ﬁrms’
chances of failure to be stronger during the crisis (i.e. we expect to observe that 1 > 2).
Finally, the crisis term is allowed to inﬂuence the probability of ﬁrm failure directly, judged
from the sign and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient 3.
(ii) Capturing Firm Heterogeneity
At the next stage we aim to assess whether changes in the level of uncertainty of ﬁrms
in and out-of-the crisis will have a diﬀerential impact on their probability to fail, taking into
account ﬁrm heterogeneity. To test this hypothesis we consider whether ﬁrms are more or
less bank dependent. This test is motivated by recent evidence, both in the UK and US,
which shows an increase in loan spreads during the crisis. In particular, Santos (2011) and
Bell and Young (2010) document that banks interrupted their lines of credit due to liquidity
problems, and thus we should expect bank dependent ﬁrms to be more severely aﬀected
during the ﬁnancial crisis.
As in Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) and Tsoukas (2011), we deﬁne bank-dependent
ﬁrms based on their ratio of short-term debt to total debt (Mix). As short-term debt is
predominately made up of bank ﬁnance, this ratio is a good proxy of bank dependency.13 We
13To ensure that our results are robust, we carry out our estimations using an alternative deﬁnition of
bank dependency based on short-term debt over current liabilities.
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modify equation (3) to contain interaction terms between the Mix ratio, the Crisis dummy
and the uncertainty measure. This yields the following empirical model:
h(j;X) = 1  exp[ exp(0 + 1Sigma Mix  Crisis+ 2Sigma Mix  (1  Crisis)+
+ 3Mix+ 4Crisis+ 5X + 6Y + j)] (5)
The sign and signiﬁcance of the interacted terms will reveal whether ﬁrms more (less)
likely to be bank dependent are less (more) likely to survive during the crisis compared to
tranquil periods. We also allow both Mix and the crisis dummy to inﬂuence ﬁrms’ chances
of failure directly.
Finally, we run the above model distinguishing between public and private companies.
According to our hypothesis, private ﬁrms are more likely to face ﬁnancial constraints and
hence may respond more strongly to uncertainty compared to public ﬁrms, especially during
the crisis period. We expect, therefore, the behavior of private ﬁrms to match that of ﬁrms
with high dependence on banks.14
IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
(A) Data Description
Our data set is drawn from the annual accounting reports taken from the Financial
Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database, published by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing
(BvDEP). We employ data for the period 2000–2009.15 We use a rich ﬁnancial data-set which
comprises mainly non-publicly traded UK manufacturing ﬁrms. Our database includes a
14To ensure that bank dependence and the distinction between private/public ﬁrms control for diﬀerent
ﬁrm aspects, we control for ﬁrms’ ownership structure when estimating models of bank dependency and vice
versa.
15A maximum of 10 years of complete data history can be downloaded at once. We have only selected ﬁrms
that have unconsolidated accounts: this ensures that the majority of the ﬁrms in our data-set are relatively
small. Moreover, it avoids the double counting of ﬁrms belonging to groups, which would be included in the
data-set if ﬁrms with consolidated accounts were also part of it.
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majority of ﬁrms which are not traded on the stock market or which are quoted on alternative
exchanges such as the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and the Oﬀ-Exchange (OFEX)
market. In fact, 98.2 % of our sampled ﬁrms are private, while 1.8% are public companies.
This ﬁgure is comparable with recent studies that employ the FAME database to analyze
UK ﬁrm’s behavior (see Brav (2009); Michaely and Roberts (2012) and Caglayan and Rashid
(2014)). Moreover, this is an appealing characteristic of the data as it allows our measures
of uncertainty and ﬁnancial health to display a wide degree of variation across observations
in our sample. Having data on unquoted ﬁrms is particularly valuable in our case, as the
unlisted companies are generally the smallest, youngest, and most-bank dependent ﬁrms.
They are, therefore, more likely to be associated with the highest degree of information
asymmetry and hence face an increased probability of failure, especially during extreme
economic conditions.
Looking at the quartile distribution of various size measures in Table 1, we observe the
variation over ﬁrms in terms of turnover, total assets and number of employees. The median
UK ﬁrm in our sample has an average of 85 employees, £4.7 mn assets and £9.5 mn turnover
which falls in the small and medium-sized enterprize category.16
To accurately construct our dependent variable we also take into account that some
ﬁrms may exit due to mergers and acquisitions. Following Görg and Spaliara (2014), we
employ Bureau Van Dijk’s ZEPHYR database which contains information on mergers and
acquisitions. Using ZEPHYR we are able to identify and drop those ﬁrms that are mistakenly
coded as “failed” in our data. This ensures that our indicator variable has been accurately
constructed to capture ﬁrms that failed and did not exit due to mergers and acquisitions.
Following normal selection criteria used in the literature, we drop ﬁrms that do not have
complete records on our main regression. To control for the potential inﬂuence of outliers,
16In the UK, sections 382 and 465 of the Companies Act 2006 deﬁne a Small and Medium-sized Enterprize
(SME) for the purpose of accounting requirements. According to this, a small company is one that has a
turnover of not more than £6.5 mn, a balance sheet total of not more than £3.26 mn and not more than 50
employees. A medium-sized company has a turnover of not more than £25.9 mn, a balance sheet total of
not more than £12.9 mn and not more than 250 employees.
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we exclude observations in the 0.5% tails for each of our regression variables. Our ﬁnal panel,
which is unbalanced, includes 9,457 ﬁrms corresponding to 51,101 observations.
(B) Descriptive Analysis
As a way of preliminary analysis, we depict the evolution of micro and macro uncertainty
in Figures 1 and 2. In ﬁgure 1 we plot average values of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty per
annum. A period of quiescence during the Great Moderation is followed by a considerable
increase in uncertainty associated with Lehman’s collapse and the Global Financial Crisis
in 2008 and 2009. We observe that both measures of uncertainty follow a similar trend over
our sample period.17
We present summary statistics for the variables used in our empirical analysis in Table
2. The ﬁgures are presented for all ﬁrms (column 1), for failed and surviving ﬁrms (columns
2 and 3) and for ﬁrms during and outside the crisis (columns 5 and 6) reporting means and
standard deviations. Further, the p-values of a test for the equality of means between failing
and surviving ﬁrms as well as crisis and non-crisis periods are presented in columns 4 and
7, respectively. We can see that the average failure rate in our sample is 16.1 percent which
much higher compared with previous UK studies ( e.g. Bunn and Redwood (2003)). The
diﬀerence between our ﬁgures and theirs may probably be due to the fact that their sample
covers a much earlier time period (up to 2003). It is therefore possible that failure rates have
increased sharply over the most recent years. This is also consistent with statistics reported
in the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS Business Demography Bulletins, 2007, 2008 and
2009).
When comparing failing and surviving ﬁrms, we note that the former exhibit a substan-
tially higher ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty. We also observe that surviving ﬁrms are less indebted
and more proﬁtable compared to failing ﬁrms. These statistics conﬁrm previous empirical
results (see Zingales (1998); Bunn and Redwood (2003); Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and
17Other indicators of economic uncertainty for the UK such as the CBI ﬁrm survey on demand uncertainty
and the FTSE option-implied volatility paint a very similar picture.
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Huynh et al. (2010)) that ﬁrms which display healthier balance sheets are less likely to
fail. In addition, we ﬁnd that survivors are larger and older which is in line with previous
empirical and theoretical research, which shows that the probability of exit decreases with
ﬁrm size and age (e.g Jovanovic (1982) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006)). Furthermore,
survivors are more likely to be part of a UK group and foreign owned. These diﬀerences
between sub-samples are statistically signiﬁcant in all cases.
Moving to the comparison between crisis and out of crisis periods (columns 5 and 6),
we note that the average failure rate and the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty are higher during the
crisis. These diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant in both cases. In addition, during the
crisis ﬁrms display lower values of leverage and higher proﬁtability. This is consistent with
the notion that ﬁrms took a substantial amount of short-term debt in the pre-crisis period
and perhaps were unable to extend it further in the later years of our sample. The latter
statistic is in line with ONS data on proﬁtability for UK manufacturing ﬁrms.18 P-values
suggest that diﬀerences between sub-samples are statistically signiﬁcant in all but one cases.
Taken together, these summary statistics suggest that there is a signiﬁcant correlation
between ﬁrms’ failure rates, ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty and ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial health. This re-
lationship is even more important during the global ﬁnancial crisis. It remains to be seen,
though, whether these preliminary ﬁndings continue to hold when we control for a number
of factors which are known to play a role in determining ﬁrms’ survival chances. In the
sections that follow we test within a formal regression analysis framework whether the sensi-
tivity of survival to ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty is signiﬁcantly higher during the ﬁnancial crisis
compared to tranquil periods.
V. MAIN RESULTS
(A) Firm-Speciﬁc Uncertainty and the Financial Crisis
To assess the role of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty in ﬁrms’ hazard of failure, we focus on
18See the ONS Statistical bulletin for details on UK ﬁrms’ proﬁtability.
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the direct and indirect (through interactions with the crisis dummy) impact on the prob-
ability of survival. We specify a time–period dummy variable to indicate that ﬁrms faced
the 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis, and this crisis dummy takes the value of one during this period,
and the value zero otherwise. Results are reported in Table 3. In column 1, we include
ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty along with time, industry and regional dummies. In the subse-
quent column, uncertainty is included along with a number of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and other control
variables to assess the consequences of a ceteris paribus increase in uncertainty on the prob-
ability of ﬁrms’ failure. Column 3 explores whether in addition to having a direct eﬀect on
ﬁrms’ chances of survival, the ﬁnancial crisis may also have an asymmetric response through
interactions with the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty.19
To begin with, the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty exerts a positive and highly
signiﬁcant eﬀect on failure. This ﬁnding is not only statistically but also economically impor-
tant. The predicted probability of exit, evaluated at the mean of the independent variables,
is 9%. The coeﬃcient on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty suggests that the probability of fail-
ure is rising, which translates to an increase in the predicted exit probability by around
12.5 percentage points. This is calculated at the mean exit probability of 9%, using the
exponentiated coeﬃcient: exp(0.869)-1=1.384, (1.384*9)=12.46%.20 Consistent with our
expectations, increases in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty will therefore negatively aﬀect ﬁrms’
survival prospects.
The point estimates on the control and ﬁnancial variables behave as conjectured. Specif-
ically, the coeﬃcient associated with the aggregate uncertainty is positive and precisely
determined, suggesting that higher levels of macro uncertainty are likely to increase the in-
cidence of corporate failure. In addition, ﬁrms which are less indebted and more proﬁtable
are less likely to fail. Larger and older ﬁrms are also less at risk compared to smaller and
younger companies that lack track record reputation. These results are in line with a number
19Time dummies are included in all models, with the exception of the crisis years 2007–09 when the crisis
term is included on its own.
20As already noted, the hazard ratio can be calculated as exp(k) for the kth regressor. Hence, in column
1 the coeﬃcient on sigma is 0.869, which is equivalent to a hazard ratio of exp(0.869)-1=1.384.
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or previous studies (Zingales (1998); Bridges and Guariglia (2008) and Görg and Spaliara
(2014)). Regarding the remaining control indicators, being part of a group and being foreign
owned improve the survival prospects of ﬁrms (Bridges and Guariglia (2008)). Lastly, as
in Baggs, Beaulieu and Fung (2009), a stronger local currency raises the probability of ﬁrm
failure, while higher levels of aggregate uncertainty will raise the probability of failure. This
is consistent with the existing evidence of negative impact of uncertainty on investment at
micro level, see for example Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007) and Baum, Caglayan and
Talavera (2010b) for a panel of UK and US ﬁrms respectively.
Moving to the interaction terms, as shown in column 3 of Table 3, we gauge the diﬀerential
role of micro-economic uncertainty in ﬁrm survival. In particular, we ﬁnd that uncertainty
has a more potent role during the crisis, since the coeﬃcient on the interaction with the
Crisis dummy is positive and highly signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence in this eﬀect across the
two time periods is economically important: a 1% increase in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty
would raise the hazard of failure by 19.45% over the crisis period 2007-2009, but only by
9.88% during tranquil periods. The p-value for the equality of the coeﬃcients indicates a
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two coeﬃcients. In addition, we ﬁnd that the
crisis dummy attains a positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient indicating that during the
crisis period the probability of ﬁrm failure is higher compared to tranquil times.
(B) The Role of Firm-Level Heterogeneity
(i) Bank-Dependent Firms
Having identiﬁed a signiﬁcant relationship between ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty, the ﬁnancial
crisis and probability of failure, we now explore whether this relationship diﬀers when we
consider ﬁrms which are likely to be dependent on bank ﬁnance. According to our hypoth-
esis, bank-dependent ﬁrms have had their lines of credit dramatically reduced during the
recent crisis. Given their inability to ﬁnance their activities from external sources (e.g stocks
or bond ﬁnance), they are likely to have suﬀered more than their less bank-dependent coun-
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terparts. Consequently, we anticipate the eﬀect of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty to be stronger
for ﬁrms exhibiting a greater reliance on bank debt compared to their less-bank dependent
counterparts. Therefore, in Table 4 we explore the impact of interactions between crisis and
non-crisis periods and ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty for ﬁrms that are more or less likely to be
categorized as bank dependent.
Focusing on rows 1 and 2 of Table 4, we observe that as ﬁrms rely more on bank debt,
the measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty displays a larger coeﬃcient during the crisis than
outside. A test for the equality of the coeﬃcients is reported at the foot of the Table. It
shows that the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients on the interactions during and outside the crisis
are statistically signiﬁcant. To put it diﬀerently, the greater sensitivities of ﬁrm survival to
changes in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty documented for more-bank ﬁrms during the crisis
than outside suggests that higher levels of uncertainty coupled with limited access to credit
may play a detrimental role in explaining the high number of failures in the UK during the
most recent ﬁnancial crisis.
With respect to the other control variables, it is worth noting that the crisis dummy
and the Mix ratio are both positive but quantitatively unimportant. Lastly, the remaining
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macro-economic variables retain their signiﬁcance, with the only exception
being the private dummy which enters with the expected positive sign but it is not precisely
determined.
(ii) Public versus Private Firms
In a ﬁnal exploration we investigate whether the behavior of public ﬁrms is diﬀerent from
that of private ﬁrms. Our rationale for the categorization of public versus non-public ﬁrms
stems from the fact that public companies are typically larger and less informationaly opaque.
Private companies, on the other hand, face a higher degree of information asymmetry and
tend to be more ﬁnancially constrained. As a consequence, for these ﬁrms lenders typically
command higher borrowing costs resulting to higher spreads (see Brav (2009) and Caglayan
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and Rashid (2014)). We hypothesize, therefore, that private ﬁrms are more likely to respond
more strongly to uncertainty compared to public ﬁrms, especially during the crisis period.
Hence, we interact a dummy variable representing the private ﬁrms (Private) with crisis and
non-crisis periods and our measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty.
The results are reported in Table 5. For private ﬁrms there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in response compared to public ﬁrms. Firm-speciﬁc uncertainty is a highly signiﬁcant de-
terminant of ﬁrm survival during the crisis compared to tranquil periods. The response of
public ﬁrms matches that of the less bank-dependent ﬁrms reported above. When we con-
sider public ﬁrms both in and out of the crisis, we ﬁnd that there is no signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
response in crisis with respect to uncertainty. We also note that the Mix ratio attains a pos-
itive coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcant at the one percent level. This ﬁnding shows that bank
dependency aﬀects the hazard rate directly since greater levels of bank reliance are likely
to increase the probability of ﬁrm failure. We conclude that public and private ﬁrms may
face diﬀerent credit supply conditions based on their speciﬁc characteristics, and responded
diﬀerently during the most recent crisis.
VI. ROBUSTNESS TESTS
(A) Re-Deﬁning Firm-Speciﬁc Uncertainty
Thus far, we have used the 3-year moving standard deviation of the unpredictable part of
sales to generate our uncertainty measure. To check the robustness of our results, we follow
Caglayan, Maioli and Mateut (2012) and construct the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty measure
using a 4-year moving standard deviation (Sigma2).21
The results are reported in Table 6. In agreement with our main results, we show that
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty is more important in predicting ﬁrm failures during the crisis
compared to tranquil times. In addition, we ﬁnd that bank-dependent ﬁrms’ survival chances
21We also experimented with measuring ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty using ﬁrms’real sales calculated over all
years preceding and including year t. Our results were robust to this modiﬁcation.
21
are aﬀected signiﬁcantly more by changes in uncertainty during the crisis compared to more
tranquil periods. In sum, we argue that our main ﬁndings are robust to an alternative
deﬁnition of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty.
(B) An Alternative Deﬁnition for Bank Dependency
To ensure the robustness of our ﬁndings, we re-deﬁne the variable indicating ﬁrms’ re-
liance on bank debt using the ratio of short-term debt to total current liabilities (Mix2).
The results are reported in Table 7. Once again, we ﬁnd that the crisis intensiﬁed the eﬀects
of uncertainty and ﬁrms which were bank dependent faced signiﬁcantly higher chances of
failures compared to less bank dependent ﬁrms. These results suggest that our main ﬁndings
are robust to using a diﬀerent deﬁnition for the bank dependency.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It is well established in the theoretical and empirical literature that uncertainty has neg-
ative consequences for economic activity. However, there is some debate about the exact
mechanism by which uncertainty aﬀects the economy. The recent ﬁnancial crisis has high-
lighted that violations of Modigliani-Miller theorem may be more transparent due to the
speciﬁc banking nature of the Great Financial Crisis. And while stock markets did suﬀer,
the impact was much more temporary. Financial markets were acting as an accelerator or
ampliﬁer of economic shocks, including uncertainty.
One popular idea is ﬁnancial conditions accelerate the uncertainty impact on the economy.
This paper sought to examine the uncertainty-ﬁrm survival nexus, with particular reference
to ﬁnancial interactions. Using a large ﬁrm-level data set we consider how ﬁnancial conditions
may have altered during the recent ﬁnancial crisis, over and above the eﬀects of ﬁrm-level
uncertainty. We also explore whether bank-dependent and private companies are impacted
to a greater extent by uncertainty. It may be reasonable to expect that ﬁrms exhibiting
greater reliance on bank debt and non-public ﬁrms shall be more sensitive to uncertainty,
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for example due to an increase in the size of their external ﬁnance premium or the extent of
available credit.
Our results document a signiﬁcant eﬀect of uncertainty on ﬁrm survival. This link is found
to be more potent during the recent ﬁnancial crisis compared with tranquil periods. We also
uncover signiﬁcant ﬁrm-level heterogeneity since the survival chances of bank-dependent and
non-public ﬁrms are most aﬀected by changes in uncertainty, especially during the recent
global ﬁnancial crisis. Our ﬁndings are of interest to policy makers who should take into
account the response of ﬁrms to uncertainty when they contemplate about policies that will
make ﬁnance to companies more readily available.
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Figure 1: The evolution of ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty
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Table 1: Detailed statistics of size variables
Employees Assets Turnover
(1) (2) (3)
25% 31 2,249 4,000
50% 85 4,748 9,586
75% 234 13,932 25,442
Observations 85,231 123,535 78,760
Notes: The table presents the median and the upper and lower quartiles of three size measures. Employees denotes the number
of employees. Assets represents total assets. Turnover is the sum of domestic and overseas turnover. Assets and turnover are
measured in thousands of UK sterling.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
All ﬁrms Fail=1 Fail=0 Diﬀ. Crisis=1 Crisis=0 Diﬀ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fail 0.161 1.00 0.00 - 0.165 0.159 0.014
(0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.36)
Sigma 0.159 0.187 0.157 0.000 0.164 0.158 0.000
(0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Leverage 0.466 0.527 0.459 0.000 0.440 0.475 0.000
(0.27) (0.31) (0.27) (0.28) (0.27)
Proﬁtability 0.076 0.037 0.081 0.000 0.088 0.072 0.000
(0.16) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
Size 3.953 3.728 3.984 0.000 4.040 3.922 0.000
(1.38) (1.29) (1.39) (1.32) (1.41)
Age 25.048 24.606 25.133 0.000 28.396 23.602 0.000
(23.01) (23.47) (22.92) (22.64) (23.02)
Group 0.212 0.099 0.233 0.000 0.210 0.213 0.325
(0.41) (0.29) (0.42) (0.41) (0.41)
Ownership 0.174 0.083 0.190 0.000 0.173 0.173 0.795
(0.38) (0.27) (0.39) (0.37) (0.38)
Exchange 96.693 96.585 96.714 0.130 84.229 102.081 0.000
(11.57) (5.01) (4.95) (9.20) (7.68)
Policy 97.539 97.899 97.470 0.110 140.106 79.141 0.000
(37.59) (37.89) (37.53) (38.49) (15.70)
Observations 51,101 4,491 46,610 16,854 34,247
Notes: The table presents sample means. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Fail is a dummy that equals one if
the ﬁrm fails, and zero otherwise. Crisis is a dummy representing the recent crisis and takes the value one in years 2007-2009,
and zero otherwise. Diﬀ. is the p-value of the test statistic for the equality of means between failing and non-falling ﬁrms
(columns 1 and 2) as well as between crisis and non-crisis periods (columns 5 and 6). Sigma is a measure of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
uncertainty. Leverage is measured as the ﬁrm’s total current liabilities to assets ratio. Proﬁtability is the ratio of the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts before interest and tax to its total assets. Size is denoted by the log of real assets. Age is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the present year and the ﬁrm’s date of incorporation. Group is a dummy variable equal to one if the ﬁrm is part of a
group UK or foreign, and zero otherwise. Ownership is a dummy equal to one if the share of foreign ownership in a ﬁrm’s equity
exceeds 25%, and zero otherwise. Exchange is the real eﬀective exchange rate. Policy is a measure of aggregate uncertainty.
Firm-speciﬁc variables are measured in thousands of UK sterling.
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Table 3: Firm survival and uncertainty
(1) (2) (3)
Sigma 0.869*** 0.782***
(13.96) (11.38)
Sigma*Crisis 1.152***
(5.74)
Sigma*(1-Crisis) 0.741***
(10.21)
Crisis 0.245***
(3.78)
Leverage 0.009* 0.009*
(1.86) (1.85)
Proﬁt -0.024* -0.024*
(-1.89) (-1.87)
Size -0.182*** -0.182***
(-15.47) (-15.47)
Age -0.002** -0.002**
(-2.47) (-2.47)
Group -0.990*** -0.990***
(-19.33) (-19.35)
Ownership -0.620*** -0.620***
(-12.59) (-12.59)
Exchange 6.469*** 6.478***
(3.76) (3.76)
Policy 1.499*** 1.501***
(3.71) (3.71)
Observations 51,762 51,101 51,101
Log-likelihood -14,101 -13,031 -13,029
Test of equality (p-value)
Sigma 0.053
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm fails, and
0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. The F-test of equality for Sigma refers to the test of equality
between Sigma*Crisis and Sigma*(1-Crisis). Time, industry and regional dummies are included in all models. *signiﬁcant at
10 %; ** signiﬁcant at 5 %; *** signiﬁcant at 1 %.
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Table 4: Uncertainty, bank dependency and the crisis
Sigma*Mix*Crisis 1.583***
(6.73)
Sigma*Mix*(1-Crisis) 0.845***
(8.23)
Crisis 0.242
(0.77)
Mix 0.063
(1.29)
Private 0.061
(0.65)
Leverage 0.007
(1.61)
Proﬁt -0.025*
(-1.93)
Size -0.180***
(-15.37)
Age -0.002***
(-2.75)
Group -0.993***
(-19.38)
Ownership -0.619***
(-12.54)
Exchange 6.438***
(3.75)
Policy 1.491***
(3.70)
Observations 51,101
Log likelihood -12,983
Test of equality (p-value)
Sigma*Mix 0.003
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm fails, and 0
otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Sigma*Mix refers to the test of equality between Sigma*Mix*Crisis
and Sigma*Mix*(1-Crisis). Time, industry and regional dummies are included in all models. *signiﬁcant at 10 %; ** signiﬁcant
at 5 %; *** signiﬁcant at 1 %.
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Table 5: Uncertainty, ownership structure and the crisis
Sigma*Private*Crisis 1.105***
(5.36)
Sigma*Private*(1-Crisis) 0.715***
(9.67)
Sigma*(1-Private)*Crisis 0.653***
(3.91)
Sigma*(1-Private)*(1-Crisis) 1.056***
(2.96)
Crisis 0.245
(0.78)
Mix 0.237***
(5.22)
Private 0.31
(1.15)
Leverage 0.008
(1.63)
Proﬁt -0.024*
(-1.87)
Size -0.179***
(-15.36)
Age -0.002**
(-2.44)
Group -0.992***
(-19.38)
Ownership -0.617***
(-12.53)
Exchange 6.475***
(3.76)
Policy 1.500***
(3.71)
Observations 51,101
Log likelihood -12,956
Test of equality (p-value)
Sigma*Private 0.074
Sigma*(1-Private) 0.309
Sigma*Crisis 0.070
Sigma*(1-Crisis) 0.347
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm fails,
and 0 otherwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Sigma*Private refers to the test of equality between
Sigma*Private*Crisis and Sigma*Private*(1-Crisis). Sigma*(1-Private) refers to the test of equality between Sigma*(1-
Private)*Crisis and Sigma*(1-Private)*(1-Crisis). Sigma*Crisis refers to the test of equality between Sigma*Private*Crisis
and Sigma*(1-Private)*Crisis. Finally, Sigma*(1-Crisis) refers to the test of equality between Sigma*Private*(1-Crisis) and
Sigma*(1-Private)*(1-Crisis). Time, industry and regional dummies are included in all models. *signiﬁcant at 10 %; **
signiﬁcant at 5 %; *** signiﬁcant at 1 %.
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Table 6: Robustness: Alternative deﬁnition of uncertainty
(1) (2)
Sigma2*Crisis 0.717***
(6.07)
Sigma2*(1-Crisis) 0.419***
(4.64)
Crisis 0.279*** 0.227
(3.69) (0.69)
Sigma2*Mix*Crisis 0.890***
(5.96)
Sigma2*Mix*(1-Crisis) 0.520***
(6.26)
Mix 0.104*
(1.92)
Leverage 0.017*** 0.015**
(3.26) (2.90)
Proﬁt -0.018 -0.019
(-1.32) (-1.18)
Size -0.206*** -0.204***
(-15.48) (-15.31)
Age -0.002* -0.002**
(-1.89) (-2.16)
Group -0.950*** -0.946***
(-16.42) (-16.37)
Ownership -0.550*** -0.555***
(-10.16) (-10.15)
Exchange 6.019*** 6.005***
(3.67) (3.67)
Policy 1.393*** 1.391***
(3.62) (3.61)
Private 0.065
(0.61)
Observations 44,559 44,559
Log likelihood -10,472 -10,473
Test of equality (p-value)
Sigma2 0.055
Sigma2*Mix 0.027
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm fails, and 0 oth-
erwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Sigma2*Mix refers to the test of equality between Sigma2*Mix*Crisis
and Sigma2*Mix*(1-Crisis). Time, industry and regional dummies are included in all models. *signiﬁcant at 10 %; ** signiﬁcant
at 5 %; *** signiﬁcant at 1 %.
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Table 7: Robustness: Alternative deﬁnition of bank dependency
Sigma*Mix2*Crisis 1.670***
(5.47)
Sigma*Mix2*(1-Crisis) 1.007***
(8.21)
Crisis 0.243
(0.76)
Mix2 -0.071
(-1.10)
Private 0.056
(0.60)
Leverage 0.007
(1.60)
Proﬁt -0.024*
(-1.89)
Size -0.185***
(-16.65)
Age -0.002***
(-2.82)
Group -0.991***
(-19.36)
Ownership -0.623***
(-12.64)
Exchange 6.438***
(3.74)
Policy 1.492***
(3.69)
Observations 51,101
Log likelihood -13,044
Test of equality (p-value)
Sigma*Mix2 0.037
Notes: Proportional hazard model results are reported. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm fails, and 0 oth-
erwise. Robust z-statistics are presented in parentheses. Sigma*Mix2 refers to the test of equality between Sigma*Mix2*Crisis
and Sigma*Mix2*(1-Crisis). Time, industry and regional dummies are included in all models. *signiﬁcant at 10 %; ** signiﬁcant
at 5 %; *** signiﬁcant at 1 %.
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